The Russian Gas Mask of WWI

Despite making up over half of all worldwide poison gas deaths, the WW1 Russian Army’s chemical protective equipment is relatively ignored by western historians. As such, finding English-Language information about them, or any information at all, can be quite a challenge. This article serves as a translation and condensation of contemporary histories and the author’s personal research and is intended to increase the availability of information on the topic in English.

A group of Imperial Russian soldiers in late 1916.

1915

The Germans first began using poison gas in the form of chlorine in the Spring of 1915, first against Algerian troops in France in April, and then against Russian troops on May 18th and 31st (Gregorian calendar). The Russian army, despite some advanced warning, was almost entirely unprepared. In their first gas attack they took an estimated 6,000 wounded and 2,000 dead. Almost immediately, the Imperial Russian Army began the monumental task of equipping the entire army with gas protection. The task was to be given to the Prince of Oldenberg, who was already chief of military sanitation and evacuation.

 “Completely unable to take quick and effective gas protection measures, the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Sanitary and Evacuation Unit enthusiastically embraced the idea of ​​the inventors on the ground, which surfaced during the first gas attack, to use urine as a means of protection from gases. Throughout the war, many official guides carried the legend of the miraculous properties of urine, recommended for impregnating wet masks, as well as scarves and greatcoats, which were suggested to wrap the face during gas attacks. This legend was carefully implanted in the heads of the soldiers.”

One early way Russian soldiers used throughout the war to combat poisonous gas was bonfires. Bonfires were used to carry poisonous gas up into the atmosphere and away from the trenches. This worked to an extent, but was a double edged sword. They not only attracted artillery fire, but also dried the anti-gas impregnation in gas masks, reducing their effectiveness.

The first gas protection equipment available to Russian troops came in 4 forms. The majority of which were made from layers of gauze soaked in a hyposulfate solution, which was believed to be the best anti-chlorine solution at that time. The solution was normally carried in a small bottle, and the mask was soaked before an attack.

An Example of an early gauze gas mask

1- Red Cross masks. Even before the May 18th gas attack, the Red Cross began manufacturing and providing gas masks to Russian soldiers. They are described as “a compress of five to six layers of gauze, stitched along the edges and equipped with two pairs of straps to strengthen the mask on the face. The length of the compress was about 15 cm, the width was 5–8 cm. There was a pocket opposite the mouth and nose, into which the lint impregnated with hyposulfite (mask-bandage of the first sample) was inserted.” These were produced in no insignificant numbers, a factory in Minsk reported to be producing 25,000 units daily.

2- Unit Procured masks. Many units, hearing about the May 18th/31st attacks, began procuring their own gas masks. The 55th Rifle Division, which was the first unit to be gassed, took their own initiative to order gas masks in Moscow in early May. However they did not arrive until the evening of May 31st, too late to help.

3- Women’s organization masks. The Prince of Oldenberg, almost immediately upon assuming responsibility for gas protection, appealed to women’s organizations across the country to begin manufacturing masks to protect against Chlorine gas. These masks varied wildly in construction and effectiveness as the organizations had little idea what they were doing, and there was no quality control

4- an “Inventive Fever” began, where various organizations and offices across the Russian Empire began manufacturing their own models of masks. Over 20 submissions came from Mining Institutes, Cities, and even a Law School. Unfortunately many of these masks aren’t described in source texts.

A unit making their own masks.

It is worth noting that none of these masks were tested before being sent to the front. There was little basis for the number of layers of gauze, meaning many were too thin to provide any real protection. Many were poorly constructed and simply fell apart. Many were too big or too small to protect effectively. Because of this, many Russian soldiers lost all trust in gas masks. On June 23/34, 1915 (old calendar), another gas attack was launched in the same sector as the first 2. The Soldiers of that front quickly realized many of their masks were useless, and threw them away. There was also a great deal of contempt from soldiers that their officers were given better gas masks than the enlisted. In addition, it was discovered that the solution used in the masks to protect against chlorine gas released poisonous levels of sulfur dioxide, making it entirely ineffective. By the summer of 1915, the recipe for the solution had changed to:

hyposulfite crystals. 30 parts

soda anhydrous 10 parts

pure glycerin 10 parts

water 70 parts

A lineup of masks from 1915. The Author believes they are respectively: The Gen Pavlov mask, the Minsk VZS mask, the Moscow VZS mask, the Petrograd Mining Institute mask, The Petrograd VZS or Smolensk VZS mask.

By the summer of 1915, dozens of varieties of masks were available at the front or offered in the rear from various organizations. The sheer variation and lack of quality control continued to wear on the soldiers’ trust of gas masks, and it became obvious that standardization and testing were urgently needed. Only in July of 1915 was a testing commission appointed. The commission soon discovered that the effects of Chlorine gas penetrated the masks easily and could be felt “from the first breaths” in many of the models they tested. Of the models tested, 4 were recognized as superior:

1. The Minsk hood, or the gas mask of the workshops of the Minsk Provincial Committee of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union. “It has the form of a bandage up to 36 cm wide and about 50 cm long .Sewn from khaki fabric impregnated with rubber or with a mixture of paraffin and rubber in order to make it impermeable to gases. In the upper part of the hood there is a rectangular hole with a celluloid plate sewn into it, which replaces glasses. In the middle part of the mask, which is in the put on position against the mouth, there are nine round holes of various sizes for the external air to enter the mask. A compress of 20 layers of gauze soaked in hyposulfite was placed inside the mask.”
2. The mask of the Moscow Committee of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union (VZS). This mask was shaped like a cap or a snout (often mistranslated as stigma) and made from 20 layers of gauze. A wire was sewn into the top edge of the mask to ensure a tighter seal around the nose. These masks were made in various workshops and varied in packaging and construction. They were supposed to be (but not always) issued with goggles. The Petrograd VZS and Smolensk VZS produced the same mask, but in different packaging.

3. The Mask of General Pavlov, approved by the commander of the NW front, was similar to the previous model, but made of flannelette. Wire was sewn into the shape of a T on the top edge and down the “nose” of the mask.

The Petrograd commission recommended the mass production of the Moscow VZS mask, factory impregnated with protective solution, made from 20 layers of gauze, issued with goggles. Following their recommendations, on July 14th the Prince of Oldenburg adopted the mask of the Moscow VZS as Snout Mask Obr.4. One mask that didn’t pass the trials, the Petrograd Mining Institute mask, would be refined and retested later.

A unit outfitted with a mixture of Minsk VZS hoods and Moscow VZS/Obr.4 “Snout Masks”. 

Almost simultaneously with the Petrograd Commission, a Moscow Commission was established to test gas masks. This commission was significantly more thorough, and almost immediately began testing masks. Their testing was interrupted very early on by the conclusion of the Petrograd committee and the adoption of the Snout Mask Obr.4. They changed their focus to evaluations of new models of masks and improvements of the approved models. They made a report on July 21st 1915 on improvements to the masks. They recommended adding rubber bands to the straps, standardized gas training (which was nonexistent at the time), and keeping masks wet at all times. 

At the end of 1915, it became clear that phosgene gas was the logical evolution of poisonous gas warfare. Even before the first gas attack, the Russian army was evaluating its use in warfare. The hydrosulfate solutions impregnating Russian and most allied nations’ gas masks were entirely ineffective against phosgene. A large scientific effort began to find a new solution that would protect against the deadly gas. On August 13th, the Moscow Technical School reported that urotropine protected effectively against Phosgene. This solution would quickly be adopted by the other allied nations as well. Once urotropine was added to Obr.4 masks, they were increased in thickness to 35 layers.

1916

The four major masks seen in  mid 1916, the Zelinski-Kumant, the Petrograd Mining Institute (With Kumant hood), the Obr.4 Snout Mask, and the British PH Helmet. (182nd Rifle Regiment, May 1917).

Development of gas masks continued as the war dragged on. The beginning of 1916 saw the predicted introduction of Phosgene gas to the battlefield, which proved to be incredibly deadly. It also saw gas mask development pass from the Prince of Oldenburg to the newly formed Chemical Committee. Four more gas mask models appeared on the front in early 1916, as the Russians raced to protect their massive army.

1. The British “ceded” a significant number of “PH” helmets at the beginning of 1916, so much that they made up 8% of gas masks on hand in the northwestern front on August 23rd, 1916. They were apparently desperately sold to the Russian army upon being outdated by the small box respirator. Even with the addition of more protective chemicals, such as urotropine, they failed to match the effectiveness of other models. They were ultimately withdrawn in september 1916, and never made up more than 10-15% of masks in theater. It is the author’s opinion that they were primarily used in a rear line capacity. 

2. The mask of the GAU chemical committee. It consists of a large beaked hood made of 30 layers of impregnated gauze with two glass eyepieces. It had an excellent webbing system, and rated “notably” better than the comparable French M2 and English PH. By the time this mask was released in late 1916, the Zelinski kumant had made it obsolete. Assumedly because they were cheap, a number were purchased in late 1916 and early 1917 and relegated to rear line duty.

3. The mask of the Petrograd Mining Institute consisted of a metal canister filter using a soda lime solution and coal for filtration. It connected to a rubber ribbon tube and a rubber mouthpiece with a nose clip and separate goggles. Later models were fitted with EL Kumant’s rubber hood. The mask was called “useless” in the Petrograd trials, repeatedly clogging. The mask was unsuccessfully redeveloped multiple times and failed trials each time. Only due to nepotism was it mass ordered in March 1916 by the Prince Oldenburg (He had friends in the institute). It was so ineffective, that it was fully scrapped and withdrawn from service by September 1916. Divisions equipped with these masks suffered devastating losses. The masks were found to be completely useless. The soda lime inside the masks often caked up with moisture from use and expanded, making breathing impossible, and even sometimes causing the cans to explode open while in use. Even in ideal conditions, the masks were incredibly uncomfortable and unpleasant to use. 

A group of officers showing a wide variety of gas masks, among them, 2 Mining Institute masks, (1st row, 2nd from left, 2nd row, 3rd from left.) 

4. The Zelinski-Kumant mask is claimed to be the technological marvel of its day. It featured a revolutionary filter designed ²by ND Zelinski and a rubber hood designed by EL Kumant. Zelinski’s filter was a scientific marvel, using activated coal to filter gas. Kumant’s rubber hood was particularly effective and easy to put on. A rubber “finger” or fold could be used to clear the lenses. There were 3 major production variations of the masks, but they all featured a round or rectangular metal can filter with a lid that held the rubber mask. The adoption of the Zelinski-Kumant mask was repeatedly sabotaged by the Prince Oldenburg in favor of the Mining Institute Mask, despite Zelinksi’s filter outperforming the Institute’s filter in every trial. The prince went as far as taking coal prioritized for producing Zelinski’s filters and had it sent to produce Mining Institute filters. The Zelinski-Kumant mask was finally approved in March 1916 when the Chemical committee took over gas mask production. The first masks began appearing at the front in May 1916. The Zelinksi-Kumant mask would come to be the predominant mask in the Russian army by 1917, and would continue service into the 1920’s in the Red Army.

A common site in 1916. The lack of availability of Zelinski-Kumant masks early on meant most ended up in the hands of officers, NCOs, or elite troops. This contributed further to the contempt toward officers. Notably, several British PH helmets are seen in this platoon.

The Zelinski mask faced many initial production shortcomings and a large sabotage campaign. As such, the Obr.4 Snout Mask continued being the primary gas mask in Russian Imperial Army stocks through much of 1916. The chart below shows the percentage of masks available to the Northwestern Front in August 1916. The full chart, broken down by armies is available at the bottom of the document.

One Continual shortcoming of the Imperial Russian Army’s effectiveness was training. Training was left to divisions on all levels at the beginning of the war, and heavily lacked standardization. In chemical protection, training was especially lacking. In one report, only one man in ten in a company were familiar with their new Zelinsky-Kumant masks. The other 90% only knew how to properly use their old snout masks. 

One commonly cited incident occurred on the Dvina river in the city of Ikshkilia. On September 25th, 1916 the 173rd and 174th rifle regiments were entrenched along the river Dvina. At 4:25AM, 5:15AM, and 6:00AM the Germans attacked with Phosgene gas followed by Infantry. Artillery and machine guns were able to break up the initial attacks, but they were unable to alert all soldiers about the gas in time. Many soldiers fought poisoned by the gas, and extremely heavy casualties were taken as a result. The 44th division is reported to have lost 25% of their strength in these attacks. 

Due to the prior incident, repeated complaints, and the large sabotage effort by the Prince of oldenburg, a final committee was formed to evaluate the Zelinski-Kumant mask. It convened October 1st 1916 and decided that the Zelinksi-Kumant mask was the best gas mask available at the front. It concluded that the causes of the initial problems were due to manufacturing issues and a lack of training. They decided that the mask did not need to be replaced. Increased training improved gas casualty rates significantly, from 20% of soldiers in an attack at the beginning of 1916, to 2-3% by winter. By 1917, that number would fall to 1-2%. 

By 1917, the Zelinsky-Kumant mask became the predominant mask of the Russian army. The October Revolution and the Russian Civil War prevented much further gas mask development until the Soviet Union could recover in the interwar period. The Zelinsky-Kumant mask continued to see service in the satellite states of the Russian Empire, and in the newly formed armies of the Russian Civil War. It saw service with the Workers and Peasants Red Army until it was replaced by newer models in 1928 and 1936.

Conclusions:

Russian gas masks have a similar development cycle to western gas masks, but they evolved in a very unique way due to the unique nature of the Russian Empire. They began in 1915 as ineffective ad-hoc bandages made by civilian organizations. They evolved through a very bumpy road of individual innovation by disconnected inventors and organizations across the Russian empire. Despite their development and implementation being slowed at all stages by the ineffectiveness of the Imperial Russian Government and systemic problems within the Russian Empire, by 1917 Russian gas masks had become some of the best in the world.

Bibliography

Figurovsky, N. A. Essay on the development of the Russian gas mask during the imperialist war of 1914-1918. Publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1942. Militara Military Literature, http://militera.lib.ru/tw/figurnovsky_na/index.html . Accessed 1 January 2021.

Taffe, Patrick. “GAS ATTACK ON THE DVINA BRIDGEHEAD, SEPTEMBER 1916.” Facebook.com, 12 November 2019, https://www.facebook.com/notes/174th-infantry-regiment-romensk/gas-attack-on-the-dvina-bridgehead-september-1916/432591904342662/.

Photographs from various sources.